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Abstract 
The emergence of AI-enabled applications has 
drawn attention to the need for AI governance. This 
essay builds on organizational governance literature 
and proposes a framework for developing 
organizational governance structures. Following a call 
to incorporate all stakeholders in governance [1], the 
framework considers the interests of all organizational 
stakeholder groups. In addition, it delineates five types 
of AI-related organizational decisions, which have the 
potential to significantly impact stakeholder interests. 
Furthermore, the framework considers four distinct 
outcomes and byproducts of AI which may impact the 
distribution of stakeholder benefits and risks. These 
need to be specifically addressed by organizational AI 
governance structures. We contend that the details 
furnished by the framework pave the way for future 
research on AI governance, adaptation in an AI-driven 
organization, and AI-related legal framework 
development. 
1. Introduction
“All stakeholders must participate in the gains and 
losses of any particular situation.”  
- Christine Lagarde, President European Central Bank
Every day, organizations make decisions that are 
related to the strategy, investments, development, and 
use of AI, and there are millions of operational decisions 
that are made daily with the help of AI. But how can an 
organization ensure that in making these decisions, it 
protects the interests and investments of its key 
stakeholders? This organizational AI governance 
question has received relatively little attention to date. 
Technical AI research, for the most part, focuses on the 
development and use of AI solutions for specific 
business problems [2]–[4]. Sociotechnical AI research 
often deals with the idealistic aspects of AI such as the 
ability of a machine to develop human level intelligence 
and the roles such machines would play in the future [5].  
Extant AI governance discourse focuses primarily on 
the design principles for ethical and trustworthy AI and 
government or public sector approaches to AI 
regulations [6], with little connection to corporate and 
organizational governance literature, or even IT 
governance. However, in practice, decisions about and 
made by AI are largely made in accordance to the 
combination and organizational and IT governance 
rules. We argue that the introduction of AI into 
organizational fabric calls for the revision of those rules 
to ensure that key stakeholder interests are accounted 
for.  
Corporate governance discussions in management 
literature are based on agency theory [7], [8], which 
calls for the enfranchisement of all stakeholders 
including vendors, suppliers, customers, employees, etc. 
Notably, the management literature, to date, has focused 
on two stakeholders: business management and 
shareholders [1]. The governance discourse in IT, 
which, for the most part, draws from the management 
governance literature, dichotomizes the stakeholders 
into IT management and business management [9]–
[12]. Yet, we contend that consistent with the recent 
calls in AMR for a theory of stakeholder governance [1], 
and the discussions of stakeholder enfranchisement and 
claimancy rights [13], AI governance needs to consider 
interests of all relevant stakeholder groups.  
This theoretical essay considers the externalities 
created by AI systems through the lens of organizational 
governance literature and IT governance discourse to 
propose an AI framework for organizational AI 
governance. With the proposed framework, we seek to 
address the following research questions: A) What is the 
goal of organizational AI governance? B) What is the 
scope of organizational AI governance? C) How should 
organizational AI governance reflect the distinct 
characteristics of AI technology? This essay offers a 
typology of AI-related decisions based on IT 
management literature and discusses how the key 
distinguishing characteristics of AI translate into new 
benefits, as well as risks, for organizational 
stakeholders. Finally, recommendations on the AI 
governance layers are discussed. 






In this section, we discuss the corporate governance
literature with emphasis on the calls for a theory of 
stakeholder governance [1] and a governance adaptation 
perspective centered on stakeholders enfranchisement, 
claimancy rights, and residual rights of control [13]. 
Next, we discuss IT governance drawing from the 
overarching corporate governance literature. We discuss 
the generalization of stakeholders in IT governance, 
which describes the need of a framework for AI 
governance. 
2.1. The role of AI in organizations 
AI is an umbrella term for technological solutions 
that incorporate capabilities commonly associated with 
human cognitive functions, such as learning, perception, 
communication and reasoning [14], [15]. Today’s AI 
solutions powered by statistical machine learning 
algorithms are capable of learning from data and 
processing natural language and visual input. These 
solutions capable of replacing humans workers, 
supporting human work or even collaborating with 
human actors in a variety of contexts are becoming a 
critical part of human-AI labor platforms [16]. 
Depending on the applications domain, AI technology 
can enhance existing organizational capabilities by 
integrating with existing products or processes, or prove 
to be a capability-destroying technological discontinuity 
[17], [18]. To date, much of the AI research focused on 
the technical side of AI or on the applications of AI to 
specific tasks and contexts, but calls have been made for 
the study of AI interactions with the organizational and 
social structures [19]. Corporate governance and IT 
governance literature provide a theoretical foundation 
for understanding the interaction of AI with 
organizational governance structures. 
2.2. Corporate governance and stakeholders 
Corporate governance work in the management 
literature is based on the agency theory [7], [8]. Till date, 
most work on corporate governance focuses on how to 
resolve potential conflicts of interest between the senior 
management of the firm and its stakeholders [1]. This 
work has widely been accepted and implemented by 
many firms across the globe [20] and has laid the 
foundation for the mechanism of governance in practice 
[21]. However, despite Jensen and Meckling’s [8] 
explanation of stakeholders (that include employees, 
suppliers, customers, creditors, etc.), much of the 
discussion on corporate governance has been limited to 
the firm’s management and the shareholders [1]. 
An AMR editorial by Amis et al. (2020) discusses 
the need for a theory of stakeholder governance [1]. This 
call for a theory of stakeholder governance is based on 
the conceptualization that the value created by a firm 
goes beyond the shareholders. If the non-shareholder 
stakeholders do not provide profit-generating resources, 
there will not be profit to distribute to the shareholders 
[22].  
The need for incorporating all stakeholders was 
underscored in a recent AMR article by Klein et al.[13]. 
According to Klein, key questions of governance are 
those of stakeholder enfranchisement, i.e. “who is in, 
who is out” of organizational decision-making, and 
claimancy rights (i.e. how the value created by an 
organization is distributed among its stakeholders). 
More specifically, organizational governance seeks to 
answer the following questions: who is involved in 
decision making, how the benefits (the value created by 
the organization) are distributed among stakeholder 
groups, and who bears the risks associated with 
organizational activity [13].  However, the discussion of 
stakeholders has largely stayed with shareholders and 
has not incorporated the larger stakeholders [1]. In the 
rest of the paper, we will focus on outlining how we can 
incorporate internal and external IT and business 
stakeholders in the discussion on formulating an AI 
governance framework. Moreover, we will focus on 
answering the questions highlighted by Klein at al. 
(2019) as a guiding principle for creating AI governance 
framework.  
2.3. IT governance 
The use of the term governance in the IT domain 
has focused more on the participation in decision-
making, rather than the value of the re-distribution of 
risk. IT governance is defined as a “framework for 
decision rights and accountabilities to encourage 
desirable behavior in the use of IT” [23]. Furthermore, 
Weill suggests that IT governance is not about what 
specific decisions are, who makes each type of decision 
(a decision right), who has input to a decision (an input 
right), and how these people or groups are held 
accountable [23]. This definition is in line with Klein’s 
explanation of governance structures as a set of rules 
that define rights and accountabilities [13]. This 
definition is also in line with an earlier definition of 
governance by Boynton et al. (1992) which suggests that 
IT governance is not concerned about the distribution of 
resources, rather the distribution of management 
responsibilities [9]. 
A literary review of IT governance in IS research 
suggests that the goal of IT governance is to administer 
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and guide an organization’s IT-related actions and 
decisions to achieve the desired outcomes [11]. Earlier 
discussions on IT governance, among other issues, have 
highlighted the importance of IT structure, that is, the 
level of centralization of IT in the organization [10], 
[12], federal mode of governance [24], and the drivers 
of IT governance structure [25], [26]. While many 
researchers focused on the structural aspect of IT, other 
researchers suggested that governing is a negotiated 
coordinating process that evolves over time, along with 
the governance structures [27]. Other researchers like 
Kude et al. (2015) used the RBV to discuss how IT 
governance capabilities (structures, processes, relational 
mechanisms) lead to business synergies [28]. 
Prior IS research has emphasized the importance of 
engagement between IT and business management [29]. 
Huang et al. (2010) explored influencing the 
effectiveness of IT governance through steering 
committees, suggesting that incorporating executive-
level stakeholders in the committee oriented the 
committee goals to be broader and longer-term, whereas 
incorporating operational/functional-level executives in 
the committee resulted in narrower short-term 
orientation [11]. Although the same general IT 
governance framework was implemented through the 
steering committee, the outcome differed by bringing 
stakeholders from different levels in organization. 
Despite Huang et al. (2010) discussion on stakeholder 
engagement, the IT governance discussions in IS 
research, for the most part, stay at a macro-level. This 
provides a vanilla framework for IT governance. The 
macro-level IT governance discussions focus on IT 
centralization [9], [10], [12], IT alignment [11], [30], IT 
strategy[25], IT executive decision making [26], [31], 
etc.  
2.4. Why we need a separate governance 
framework for AI? 
The discussion thus far highlighted the need for 
incorporating stakeholders in governance discussion [1] 
and the need for the IS literature to develop technology-
specific governance frameworks for different 
technology sub-domains in IT. Next, we discuss how AI 
is different from other technologies.  
Theoretical definitions of artificial intelligence 
allude the ability of machines to exhibit a human level 
of intelligence or even conscience, and are not bound by 
any specific technology or algorithmic solutions [14]. 
At the same time businesses adopt a practical notion of 
AI which encompasses IT solutions through the use of 
machine learning (ML), in conjunction with 
optimization-based and rule-based algorithms for 
insight generation, decision support and decision-
making [32], [33]. In this section we will rely on this 
practical, technology bound definition, as it is 
sufficiently tangible to help identify the distinguishing 
characteristics of AI-enabled solutions and develop an 
AI governance framework.  
Whether used for insight generation, decision 
support, or decision automation, ML-based AI solutions 
share the following common characteristics which are 
relevant to this discussion: (1) their development and 
maintenance requires large volumes of machine 
readable data, (2) they involve the creation of new 
knowledge in the form of a trained model, i.e. 
knowledge not directly consumable or verifiable by 
humans, (3) they are capable of producing autonomous 
or semi-autonomous outputs, such as insight, 
recommendations, decisions, actions, or artifacts, and 
(4) once deployed, they enable insight generation and
decision automation at a significantly faster rate than
human decision making (and at a fraction of the cost per 
decision). These characteristics have implications for
how value is created by an organization and the
contributions made by different stakeholder groups to
value creation.
These distinct characteristics of AI require lead to 
the emergence of new values sources (benefits) and new 
risks, thus requiring the renegotiation of existing 
stakeholder arrangements, and often the engagement of 
new stakeholder groups in the decision-making process.  
3. AI governance framework
Building on the corporate governance theory, we
conceptualize AI governance as a set of structures that 
ensure that relevant organizational stakeholders 
continue to work together and contribute their resources 
(money, time, effort, data). Said resources are necessary 
for the achievement of organizational goals when AI is 
introduced into organizational socio-technical eco-
system. In devising AI governance, it is critical to ensure 
that all relevant stakeholder groups are accounted for. 
Regarding traditional firms, existing stakeholder groups 
include shareholders, employees, customers, and 
suppliers [8]. New stakeholder groups may include AI 
developers and vendors, AI solution and data providers, 
as well as customers in AI-enabled markets.  
As AI is introduced, it affects all three components 
that are traditionally addressed by governance: (1) how 
decisions are made and how different stakeholder 
groups are engaged in decision making, (2) how value 
(benefits) associated with AI is distributed, and (3) who 
bears the risks associated with AI. We contend that the 
goal of organizational AI governance is to providing 
answers to these three questions.  
Consistent with this goal, the proposed AI 
governance framework provides guidance about the 
relevant risks and benefits that are distinct for AI-
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enabled systems, relevant decision types, relevant 
stakeholder groups, and the building blocks of AI 
governance structure.  
Figure 1. Proposed AI governance framework 
3.1. Relevant stakeholder groups 
Identification of relevant stakeholders is the first 
step in defining the scope of AI governance. For 
determining the relevant stakeholders for AI, we follow 
the guidelines in Jensen and Meckling’s 
recommendations from the theory of the firm that 
stakeholders should include employees, suppliers, 
customers, creditors, vendors, etc. [8]. For the 
organization and understanding perspective, we propose 
two dichotomies of the stakeholders: internal vs. 
external stakeholders, and stakeholders associated with 
upstream processes vs. downstream processes. These 
dichotomies are not mutually exclusive, rather they 
provide two different lenses to view and acknowledge 
the AI stakeholders in the organization. We explain 
these dichotomies next. 
The external stakeholders include the firm 
shareholders, customers, suppliers, and vendors 
(including suppliers of external data and IT vendors). 
Many of the AI applications deal with customers’ data - 
whether it be recommending better products and 
services to the customers, or enhancing customers’ 
experience using AI, customers are the focal point of 
most, if not all, AI solutions. Customers gain better 
experience, better service, and better products, while 
risking their privacy. However, customers’ perceptions 
vary in terms of use of their data by the organization; 
some customers value the gains, while others are 
concerned about the risks. By making AI a part of their 
relationship with a customer, organizations can gain 
more business from the existing customers, earn trust, 
gain new customers through the word of mouth, and 
reduce customer churn. On the other side, the 
organization risks loss of revenue, customer loyalty and 
trust if the customers’ expectation about privacy and 
ethical use of data are not met. 
AI implementations often use external data and IT 
vendors. Data vendors are third-party organizations that 
sell secondary data, which is often used for augmenting 
the internal data sources or for comparisons with the 
market or competitors. IT vendors and suppliers are 
used to provide software or resources for AI 
implementations. In these relationships with the IT 
vendors or suppliers, the organization gains access to 
readily usable resources in the form of data, software, or 
skills. However, the organization risks the disclosure of 
competitive strategy, extensive cost, reliance on 
external resources, and delay in building in-house 
capabilities.  
The internal stakeholders include focal process 
participants, including employees and decision makers, 
the IT organization, and the data management group that 
is often a part of the IT organization. The data 
management group houses and maintains the corporate 
data resources, which are used by AI/ML algorithms. 
Moreover, a byproduct of AI is the creation of insights 
and maturity of existing data, which is also managed by 
the data management group. In addition to providing the 
data repositories, IT can offer expertise in application 
integration, software development, IT infrastructure and 
architecture support for building scalable AI solutions, 
and lastly, project management expertise in executing 
the AI projects.  
The second dichotomy views the stakeholders from 
the upstream and downstream processes perspective. 
Upstream processes are those processes that create data 
that is used for model training and as an input into model 
scoring. Downstream processes are those processes that 
rely on decision made or recommended by AI. For 
example, an upstream process could include acquiring 
auxiliary data from customers, suppliers, or vendors and 
incorporating it in the corporate data repositories. This 
process may require the resources provided by an IT 
vendor or internal resources provided by IT. Participants 
of both upstream and downstream processes are 
important AI stakeholders, and need to be included in 
the scope of AI governance.   
3.2 AI-related decisions 
Another lens for defining the scope of AI 
governance is by the types of decisions included. In 
organizational context, AI can be viewed as an IT 
resource which is designed, developed, deployed, and 
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used to create value and achieve the strategic objectives 
of an organization. From the resource-based 
perspective, relevant decisions include strategy, 
investment, development and implementation, 
adoption, and use of AI. However, AI can also be 
viewed as an actor, possessing a certain degree of 
autonomy. Therefore, AI governance needs to cover two 
more types of decisions: decisions made by AI, as well 
as AI control and monitoring decisions. We contend that 
these five decision types, along with the relevant 
stakeholder groups, define the scope of AI governance.  
3.2.1. AI strategy decisions 
AI strategy decisions reflect the role AI plays in 
organizational strategy, and thus define priorities for AI 
investment decisions. AI can be a valuable resource if it 
translates into customer-valued product enhancements, 
or cost-cutting productivity improvements. However, to 
be a source of competitive advantage, organizational AI 
resources must to be rare, non-imitable and non-
substitutable [34]. The role of AI strategy is to define (1) 
the extent to which an organization views AI as a source 
of competitive advantage, and (2) the specific types of 
AI investments that would lead to the biggest value 
creation and without being easily replicated by 
competitors.   Because the field of AI is a highly 
dynamic one, any one bundle of AI-based resources 
cannot be a source of competitive advantage over a long 
period of time. Thus, AI strategy also needs to outline 
how the organization plans to approach the creation of 
AI dynamic capabilities, i.e. organizational resources 
that would allow the identification of new opportunities 
associated with AI, devise AI development strategies, 
and reconfigure existing AI resources to take advantage 
of new capabilities.   
3.2.2. AI investment decisions 
AI investment decisions are concerned with the 
allocation of organizational resources to the 
development or acquisition of specific AI capabilities in 
support specific strategic objectives. AI investment 
decisions involve the determination of whether a 
specific AI investment alternative is aligned with the 
organizational AI strategy, and whether it is 
economically and technically feasible. AI investment 
decisions may be related to specific AI projects or AI 
programs that span multiple projects. They may involve 
evaluating a business application that includes AI 
components, vis-à-vis a non-AI alternative, or 
approving an in-house operational AI development 
program. Investment decisions rely on estimates of the 
costs and benefits associated with each investment 
option, and thus require an accurate estimation of scope. 
Yet, scope definition is less than straightforward when 
it comes to AI.  Because AI is inherently data-driven, AI 
investment decisions have critical implications not only 
for the downstream processes, i.e. the processes using 
AI outputs, but also for the up-stream processes, i.e. the 
processes that create the data used by AI for model 
training and scoring. Therefore, successful AI 
implementations may include changes to upstream or 
downstream business processes, and significant 
investments into data management infrastructure [35]. 
On the downstream side, the benefits of AI projects can 
only be realized if AI outputs (recommendations, 
decisions or automations) are effectively integrated 
within business applications and are used by humans in 
an effective manner. Thus, understanding the potential 
of change management associated with such integration 
needs to be taken into account when defining the scope 
of AI implementation projects [36]. Identifying critical 
stakeholders and engaging them in the investment 
decisions can help ensure the projects include sufficient 
incentives for all relevant stakeholder groups to 
contribute to the project. 
3.2.3. AI design, development and implementation 
decisions 
AI investment decisions are translated into the 
scope, cost and schedule targets for AI development and 
implementation projects, and as such, set the stage for 
AI development decisions. AI development decisions 
involve the choices that are made by data scientists, ML 
engineers and application developers involved in the 
project. What sources of data are reliable? Is data clean 
enough to be used in real time? How should data 
transformation pipelines be designed?  How should an 
ML problem be formulated to reflect the business 
decision needs? How should model performance be 
evaluated to ensure that business benefits are optimized? 
What algorithm and how should the system be 
architected given the business requirements? Although 
these decisions appear technical on the surface, they are 
grounded in the needs of the business and the 
understanding of underlying business processes. 
Engaging relevant stakeholders into development 
decisions can ensure that stakeholder needs are 
understood and addressed problems are avoided further 
down the road. This is consistent with the overall IS 
development literature, which suggests that user 
engagement in a system’s development projects is a 
critical success factor in system development and 
implementation projects [37].  
3.2.4. AI adoption and use decisions 
AI outputs may range from decision insight and 
recommendations to full decision automation. However, 
the overall success of an AI enabled system depends on 
its ability to integrate with human-led processes, and 
thus depends on the willingness of humans to use AI, or 
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collaborate with it. The questions of IT adoption and use 
has occupied a central space in IS research, along with 
related questions of trust, autonomy, accountability, and 
privacy. AI adoption and user decisions provide answers 
to questions such as: Should AI be used? Who should 
use AI? How should AI be used?  How much should AI 
be trusted? Establishing rules for making such decisions 
falls within the scope of AI governance. Although not 
explicitly framed as such, many of the 
responsible/trustworthy/ethical AI frameworks have 
focused on the AI adoption and use decisions, and how 
they are influenced by AI development decisions. For 
example, the principle of autonomy considered a 
cornerstone of responsible AI suggests that humans 
should be able to make informed decision about the use 
of AI. But what does it mean in organizational context? 
Would including representatives of a stakeholder group 
into making an adoption decision on behalf of all group 
members be enough for satisfying the autonomy 
principle?  AI adoption and use decisions also include 
defining what constitutes the appropriate and effective 
use of AI. Does it mean full trust in AI decisions, or the 
“hands on the wheel” approach? Having an answer to 
this process may be helpful in informing not only AI 
development, but also AI investment decisions.  
3.2.5. Decisions made by AI 
At the organizational level, AI is adopted to support 
or automate business decisions. AI decision logic is not 
defined a priori, but is learned from data and adjusted 
based on environmental responses [15]. Furthermore, 
such logic is expressed in the form of complex 
mathematical expressions and is not easily understood 
by humans. This gives AI the level of decision 
autonomy not afforded to other IT, making AI the 
subject of organizational governance, rather just an 
object of organizational decisions. Thus, an important 
aspect of AI governance should deal with defining 
classes of organizational decisions in which AI can 
participate, and the degree of such participation. For 
example, the rules of AI governance could speculate that 
any decision with value at risk below a certain threshold 
can be made by AI without any human oversight. It may 
also speculate that certain level of explainability be 
required for AI to be used for certain types of decisions, 
such as those affecting the well-being of human 
stakeholders. Importantly, many organizational 
decisions are made collaboratively and involve the re-
negotiation of stakeholder participation in value and risk 
sharing. When such decisions are made by AI, 
stakeholders’ ability to defend their interest in the 
decisions is lost, resulting in potential 
disenfranchisement of important stakeholder groups. 
Recognizing the negotiations aspect of organizational 
decision making, creating adequate appeal and 
grievances procedures for decisions made by AI can 
help maintain stakeholder engagement, but also 
improve the AI-based decision making in the long run. 
These five decision types outlined here are inter-
related, and together they constitute the scope of 
organizational AI governance. 
3.3. AI Risks and benefits 
To ensure that organizational AI governance 
reflects distinct characteristics of AI technology, the 
gains and risks of AI need to be considered in relation 
to its various outcomes (and byproducts). These 
include the vast volumes of data needed to support AI, 
the migration of organizational knowledge from a 
human-readable to machine-readable format, the actual 
outputs produced by AI, and the scale and speed at 
which these outputs can be produced.  
3.3.1. AI data dependence and the need for dynamic 
renegotiation 
The dependence of AI on data significantly 
increases the relative value of machine-readable data 
vis-à-vis other resources in an organization. Not only 
does it make data a necessary input into the value 
creation process, but it also makes it a potentially 
valuable output, that can be monetized [38]. At the same 
time, creation of AI-usable data is associated with 
perceived and actual costs for stakeholders. Such costs 
range from additional efforts associated with data 
disclosure, to investments in converting sensing 
technologies or the conversion of human-readable data 
into a machine-readable format, to privacy loss.  This 
creates pressure for the re-negotiation of claimancy 
rights, which are “the rules on the distribution of jointly 
created value” [13]. Stakeholders involved in the 
production of data can expect higher levels of 
compensation to ensure the congruence between 
resource provisions and value appropriation. Secondly, 
new rules need to be established regarding the 
appropriation of the value created in the form of data. In 
the absence of such rules, the value created through data 
would be appropriated by stakeholder groups with 
residual claimancy rights, such as firm shareholders. In 
the absence of appropriate adjustments to the claimancy 
rules, stakeholders involved in data production may 
resist participation in the data creation, by refusing to 
consent to corporate use of personal data, participating 
in organizational politics or social movements, or 
simply failing to put additional effort necessary for 
producing high quality AI-usable data. As new AI 
systems come on board, the value associated with 
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different data resources changes, creating the need to 
governance mechanisms that would allow dynamic 
renegotiation of claimancy rights over data resources. 
Such renegotiation of claimancy rights requires 
stakeholder enfranchisement mechanisms would 
include organizational stakeholders involved in the 
production of data in the AI-related decisions.  
3.3.2. Machine-readable knowledge  
A key characteristic of modern AI is the shift from 
human-centered to machine-centered knowledge 
production. In a broad sense, knowledge can be thought 
of as a collection of assertions about the world that we 
believe to be true, and thus base our actions on them. 
Traditionally, knowledge creation and transfer has been 
viewed as a strictly human phenomena, related to 
cognition and human information processing. Not 
surprisingly, machine learning, i.e. the ability of a 
computer to create knowledge has been considered a 
holy grail of AI, along with other knowledge related 
subfields of AI such as automated reasoning and 
knowledge representation [39]. Early forms of AI, such 
as expert systems, relied on the codification of human 
knowledge, i.e. the knowledge that was primarily 
created for human consumption and then adapted for use 
by AI. In contrast, ML-based AI is able to create 
knowledge in the form of machine-readable models. As 
such, the knowledge is created primarily for machine 
consumption, and is only suitable for human 
consumption with the help of secondary mechanisms, 
such as explanation algorithms. This shift has important 
implications for organizational value creation and 
appropriation, and thus may have significant impact on 
claimancy rights and stakeholder enfranchisement. Like 
data, knowledge is an important resource used in 
organizational value creation, but also has intrinsic 
value to the extent that it can be internalized by a 
stakeholder and then applied in a different situation.  As 
such, knowledge can be viewed as a contribution by a 
stakeholder, but also as a valuable asset, along with 
other types of intellectual property. As machine 
knowledge becomes a viable substitute for human 
knowledge, organizational stakeholders may perceive 
their knowledge contribution as less valuable, invest 
less in knowledge acquisition, and agree to a reduction 
in claimancy rights by accepting lower compensation or 
become disenfranchised by withdrawing from 
organizational decision processes.  On the other hand, 
the shift to machine knowledge can make knowledge 
acquisition more difficult for humans, thus making it 
more difficult to appropriate value through learning on 
the job. Lack of machine-to-human knowledge 
transferability creates the risk of disenfranchisement on 
the part of human stakeholders, as they may believe that 
they do not have sufficient knowledge to contribute to 
organizational decisions.  
Another implication of machine knowledge is that 
it leads to the creation of AI-generated IP.  Although the 
AI-generated painting that fetched $469K at Christy 
auction in 2019 made the international news, relatively 
little research exists on the topic of AI-generated IP 
ownership [40]. To date, the share of AI-generated IP is 
relatively low, but it is bound to increase exponentially 
as the generative capabilities of AI approach those of 
humans. For example, OpenAI’s NLP service, GPT-3, 
has been used for the creation of text ranging from blogs 
to computer code. To the extent that the content 
generated by AI is not particularly valuable, defining the 
claimancy rights over the value generated by AI may be 
straightforward. But as the value of AI-generated IP 
grows, new governance approaches need to be designed 
and implemented to deal with potential stakeholder 
conflicts. 
3.3.3. Autonomous outputs of AI 
Enabling machines to make decisions and select a 
course of action autonomously, based on the state of the 
environment, is at the core of the AI development 
efforts. Today, AI can make a variety of simple 
decisions with the degree of accuracy similar to or above 
that achieved by human decision makers. Most of us are 
happy to delegate mundane decisions such as spam 
filtering or finding the optimal route to a client’s 
location to algorithms. Algorithms are increasingly 
deployed in organizations to make a variety of 
decisions, usually of repetitive and mundane kind, such 
as checking for manufacturing defects, placing 
inventory orders, or recommending the best product 
based on the customer characteristics. The transfer of 
decision-making responsibilities to AI creates benefits 
and carries risks, and the AI governance needs to 
provide guidance on the allocation of such risks and 
benefits. An example, which might be a bit extreme in 
terms of consequences, is the use of opaque AI systems 
in clinical decision making. In this scenario, an AI 
system would accept information about a patient and 
make recommendations for the patient’s care to the 
clinician [41]. The process speeds up the clinician’s time 
for case evaluation and diagnosis, which benefits the 
hospital administration in terms of gains [42]. However, 
in the case of a loss, which could be as severe as the loss 
of a patient’s life due to incorrect treatment, there are 
many concerns about opacity, responsibility, and 
accountability among the key stakeholders: hospital 
administration, hospital IT, vendor for AI solution, 
hospital data owners, and clinician [42]. 
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3.3.4. The scale and speed associated with AI-based 
decisions  
Apart from the benefits and risks associated with 
individual AI-based decision, the ability of AI to make 
decisions at a speed and scale that cannot be achieved 
by human decision makers carries a separate set of 
benefits and risks for different stakeholder groups. 
Faster decisions can translate to faster service, and thus 
create value for the customer. They can also result in 
devaluing the contributions of existing human decision 
makers, resulting in the need for the renegotiation of 
stakeholder rights.  
4. Discussion, implications, & future
research
The AI framework defines the goal of AI 
governance in terms of the questions about stakeholder 
enfranchisement and distribution of value and risks 
associate with AI, and outlines the scope of AI 
governance in terms of relevant stakeholder groups and 
decision types. Furthermore, the framework draws 
attention to four distinct characteristics of AI that must 
be addressed by AI governance structures. But how can 
AI goals be achieved in practice?  Insights about 
building blocks of a governance structure can be 
gleaned from the regulation theory and AI governance 
frameworks in the public domain [43], which points to 
policies, processes and collaborations as critical 
building blocks of AI governance. Using the 
organizational AI framework presented here and 
combining it with the framework furnished in Wirtz et 
al. [43], processes can be defined for AI-related  risk 
management, framing, and risk-benefit analysis for AI 
at the corporate as well as project level. Similarly, 
social, ethical, organizational, and IT policies can be 
defined to address the risks related to AI. Moreover, 
collaboration bodies such as stakeholder committees, 
and regulation and governance committees can be 
designed at IT, project, departmental, and corporate 
level. The goal of having these committees at different 
levels in the organization is to keep checks and balances 
and to avoid unforeseen risks related to social, ethical, 
and legal challenges for the organization and its 
stakeholders.  
Moreover, the AI governance framework and its 
components discussed in this paper provides the 
grounding for future AI research studies. For example, 
this research framework could be used to inform the 
organizational actors to facilitate adaptation and the 
pathways available for organizational actors should the 
external and institutional environment for the 
organization changes. External environment (EE), 
generally includes technology, demand, and 
institutional shocks that affect the firm’s behavior and 
performance, whereas institutional environment (IE) 
refers to the specific formal and informal legal, political, 
and social structures and processes in the EE that frame 
organizational governance structures [13]. More 
specifically, the AI governance framework presented in 
this paper informs the enfranchised stakeholders to 
renegotiate the risks, gains, and claimancy rights when 
the organization experience changes in the IE and EE. 
Furthermore, the framework provides the means of 
analyzing the impact of AI as an EE as well as an IE 
agent. Lastly, The lack of opacity, accountability, and 
responsibility in healthcare for the use or AI systems 
was recently highlighted by Helen Smith [42]. We 
contend that the framework furnished in this paper 
coupled with the regulation framework by Wirtz et al. 
[43] can help regulate different accountability, opacity, 
and responsibility scenarios that will provide the basis 
for legal frameworks for AI systems across distinct 
domains and sectors.  
The goal of this article, more specifically the AI 
governance framework, is to provide a holistic view of 
AI in the organizational context that can be used to 
inform IS researchers as well as practice. The AI 
governance framework highlights several directions for 
building testable hypotheses regarding specific AI-
related decision types and AI risks and benefits. Such 
hypotheses are expected to draw on the theoretical basis 
that are most closely related to the decision domain. For 
example, AI adoption and use decision hypotheses are 
expected to draw on the extensive technology adoption 
and trust literature, whereas hypotheses related to AI 
strategy decisions are expected to draw on strategic 
management theories. Last, but not least, evaluating and 
comparing the AI risks, gains, stakeholders, and AI 
decisions across task substitution (AI substitute 
humans), task augmentation (AI and humans 
complement each other), and task assemblage (AI and 
humans function as a unit) [5] provides unique insights 
for future research.  
5. Conclusion
Drawing on organizational governance literature,
the framework defines the goal of organizational AI 
governance as providing answers to three questions: 
Who is involved in decision making about AI? How are 
the benefits of AI distributed among organizational 
stakeholders? Who bears the risks associated with AI?   
The framework further outlines the scope of AI 
governance in relation to key stakeholder groups and 
five relevant decision types: AI strategy, AI 
investments, AI development, AI adoption and use and 
decisions made by AI. It further delineates the risks and 
benefits associated with AI in relation to four distinct 
characteristics of AI technology: reliance on data, 
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machine knowledge, autonomous decisions and scale 
and scope. We hope that the proposed framework can 
serve as a starting point in defining processes, policies, 
and collaboration bodies that can furnish the governance 
and AI regulatory implementation at an organizational 
level. We also contend that AI framework presented in 
this paper provides the foundational basis for 
redistribution and renegotiations of risks, benefits, 
enfranchisements, and claimancy rights to facilitate 
organizational adaptation. Lastly, we contend that the 
AI framework presented in this paper provides the 
grounding and future research agenda for creating legal 
frameworks for mitigating opacity, accountability, and 
responsibility issues related to AI-drive decision 
making. 
This study contributes to the IS literature and 
informs future research on AI in many ways. One, we 
addressed the dichotomous categorization of 
stakeholders in IS research by providing a framework 
for AI that incorporates enfranchised stakeholders, 
risks, benefits, and decisions. This will pave the way for 
more granular governance discussions in IS research for 
other sub-domains of IT. Two, the framework for AI 
that lays out the key components of AI governance 
provides grounding for future research in many 
directions. For example, the details furnished in the 
paper can be combined with the processes, policies, and 
collaboration bodies discussed by Wirtz et al. [43] to 
inform governance structures for public, private, and 
public-private partnerships. Similarly, our framework of 
AI components can provide the foundational basis for 
redistribution and renegotiations of risks, benefits, 
enfranchisements, and claimancy rights to facilitate 
organizational adaptation [13]. Lastly, our framework 
can provide the foundational basis for legal frameworks 
for opacity, accountability, and responsibility [42] for 
AI system use in different public and private 
organizations. 
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